INTRODUCTION
Although American criminal suspects who are deaf possess the same constitutional rights as hearing suspects, they are often denied full protection of those rights. The criminal justice system protects the rights of criminal suspects by guaranteeing Miranda warnings, public trials, the right to confront witnesses, and the assistance of counsel.
1 These protections, however, involve the use of spoken words that deaf criminal suspects cannot comprehend without the aid of a sign language interpreter. 2 Although it is not a perfect guarantee, sign language interpretation 3 is essential to protect fully deaf criminal suspects' right to * The author would like to thank attorneys Ora Schub, Robert Burns, Barbara Samuels, and Donald Paull, as well as interpreters Tom Cunningham, Mary Mulcrone, and Shirley Stefanski, for their valuable assistance in preparing this Comment.
1 The United States Constitution and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court guarantee these rights. The fifth amendment provides: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
The sixth amendment provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the Witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor; and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) , the Supreme Court guaranteed to criminal suspects the right to be warned effectively of their constitutional rights before in-custody interrogation, and the Court guaranteed the right to assistance of counsel in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) .
2 Some deaf persons competently speechread (or lipread) and speak effectively. Although speechreading deaf suspects confront fewer problems in the criminal justice system than deaf suspects who cannot speechread and are refused sign language interpreters, speechreading alone is inadequate protection of the rights of the deaf criminal suspect. The criminal process is not well-suited to the use of speechreading. See infra note 11.
3 The American Linguists Association has accorded American Sign Language (A.S.L.) the status of a "language." In the United States, there are two principal forms of sign language for the deaf: American Sign Language (A.S.L. or Ameslan) and Signed English (S.E. or Seglish). Signed English closely follows the grammar of the English language; A.S.L., which has its own grammar, is more conceptual. Although many educators and hearing people favor Signed English, A.S.L. is the language of the deaf. As a result, most deaf criminal suspects will communicate in A.S.L. Like all languages, A.S.L. varies among different geo-and procedures of the criminal justice system.
The federal government and thirty-nine states now provide sign language interpretation in some criminal proceedings as a means of communication with deaf criminal suspects.' 3 These recent laws indicate a growing public and political awareness of the problems of the handicapped, evidenced by the enactment of a large body of civil rights laws for the handicapped within the past decade.
14 Yet, the present laws that provide for interpreting in the criminal justice system do not sufficiently protect deaf criminal suspects' right to understand the proceedings at all stages of the criminal process. 5 This Comment argues that deaf criminal suspects possess the right to understand and participate in all criminal proceedings and that this right can be protected only when a qualified interpreter is provided. Presently, the criminal justice system's response to this need is inadequate. Thus, this Comment suggests improvements needed in the interpreting laws and within the criminal justice system to ensure full protection of deaf criminal suspects' right to understand the proceedings at all stages of the criminal process.
I. THE RIGHT TO UNDERSTAND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The United States Constitution does not provide deaf criminal suspects with an absolute or specific right to an interpreter. The Constitution does, however, grant all suspects, hearing and deaf, the rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 16 to be silent,' 7 to the Comprehensive Skills Certificate (C.S.C.), the Legal Skills Certificate (L.S.C.), and the Reverse Skills Certificate (R.S.C.). The licenses require minimum training levels and hours of interpreting experience in different interpreting situations. The R.S.C. interpreter, often a deaf person, is trained to translate American Sign Language (A.S.L.) for deaf persons with low grammatical skills. R.S.C. interpreting therefore requires two interpreters: one to interpret spoken words into A.S.L. and one to interpret A.S.L. into the grammatically simpler signs and concepts.
The R.I.D. requires L.S.C. interpreters to take intensive training courses and examinations in legal practices and procedures. About 100 interpreters in the United States have the L.S.C. certificate. These L.S.C. interpreters are the most qualified to interpret at any stage of the criminal process because they have training specifically geared towards interpreting in the criminal justice system. Personal Interview with Mary Mulcrone and Shirley Stefanski, Interpreters with the Chicago Hearing Society, in Chicago (Sept. 15, 1982) .
13 See infia note 23. 14 See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § § 701-96 (1973) (providing the handicapped, inter alia, equal access to public buildings and equal opportunities for employment).
15 While the state statutes vary widely in focus, coverage, and effectiveness, many of the interpreting laws contain major weaknesses: they provide for interpreters only at trial, they require the deaf person to compensate the interpreter, and they lack standards of training and competency for interpreters. See infra text accompanying notes 142-68.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, supra note 1.
the assistance of counsel, 18 to confront adverse witnesses,' 9 and to due process of law. 20 Courts have protected these rights in cases involving deaf and foreign-language-speaking defendants by providing a right to foreign-language interpreters at the trial stage of the criminal process.
2 1
Courts thus have attemped to protect defendants' right to understand the proceedings at trial. 22 In addition, thirty-nine states provide by statute for the mandatory appointment of sign language interpreters for deaf criminal defendants at trial.
23
18 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, supra note 1.
19 Id.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V, supra note 1. 21 In cases involving foreign-language-speaking suspects, courts have provided the right to interpreters where the interpreters would aid the suspect's understanding in order to protect the suspect's constitutional rights of confrontation, assistance of counsel, and due process. See in/fa text accompanying notes 87-111. 22 In State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903 (1942) , the Utah court ruled that the defendant had a right to understand the proceedings:
[T]he defendant has the right to see the witness testifying against him and to hear what the witness says. Are these rights more essential, or even as essential, than the right to understand what is going on in the proceeding? Suppose a defendant were placed in a transparent compartment where he could see all that took place, yet was deprived of hearing what was said because all sound was cut off, could it be said that such a situation were less than a deprivation of the constitutional right of confrontation? The purpose of the confrontation must be to permit the defendant to be advised of the proceedings against him. Id. at 449-50, 121 P.2d at 905. Likewise, in Mothershead v. King, 112 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1940 , the court of appeals affirmed the suspect's right to understand the proceedings, noting that " [t] The constitutional rights guaranteed by the fifth and sixth amendments must be protected at other stages of the criminal process. All suspects have the same right to understand the proceedings, but deaf suspects have a physical inability to understand criminal proceedings without the aid of a sign language interpreter. Because the Constitution grants all criminal suspects, deaf and hearing, the same guarantees of justice and fairness, criminal justice officials must protect deaf suspects' rights to understand and participate in criminal proceedings while under arrest, while standing trial, and while incarcerated. 24 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) . In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that officers interrogating suspects after they have been taken into custody must inform them of their constitutional rights: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444. Further, the Court indicated throughout its opinion that the warnings must be full and effective. In none of three other cases involving foreign-language-speaking suspects did a court conclude that the suspect failed to understand Miranda warnings.
32
Several states recently have recognized by statute that deaf criminal suspects need sign language interpretation to understand Miranda warnings fully and effectively and to be adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. 33 Fifteen states now provide deaf sus-
28
The Miranda Court asserted:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact ... [A] warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time. Id. at 468-69. Although giving an adequate warning is not "so simple" when the suspect is deaf, the Court implies that an adequate warning is only one that informs the suspect. Two states allow the discretionary appointment of interpreters in grand jury proceedings. Ohio permits interpreters "where needed," OHIo R. CRim. P. 6(e). Vermont's similar rule provides that an interpreter may be present, VT. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). 42 The court noted the allegations, verified by affidavit, that "numerous similarly situated individuals" were denied the benefits of the Oklahoma interpreting statute: "Indeed, the uncontroverted, verified petition asserts that such deprivation of deaf-mutes' rights amounted to a continuous course of conduct on the part of the City of Oklahoma City and its agents and employees .... [W] e must accept the verified allegations as true." Kiddy, 576 P.2d at 301. 43 The Oklahoma statute considered by the court in Kiddy provided: Every deaf-mute person who is charged with the commission of a criminal offense shall be entitled to the assistance and services of a qualified interpreter. Prior to questioning upon arrest and all subsequent proceedings, the court shall procure a qualified interpreter to assist such persons in communications with officers of the court. "When a deaf-mute is arrested he shall be entitled to the assistance of an interpreter. Evidence by the state relating to any statement made by a deaf-mute to a law enforcement officer shall be limited solely to statements offered, elicited, or made in the presence of a qualified interpreter." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 278, replaced by OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § § 2407-2415 (West Supp. 1983) .
44 The court noted the denial of Kiddy's constitutional rights: "George Kiddy was left to languish in jail for two days after arrest and was arraigned without benefit of an interpreter and without being apprised of: the charges against him, his right to counsel, the right to remain silent, and the right to be released on bail." Kiddy, 576 P.2d at 301.
45 Id at 300.
46 Id at 301. The court also noted that police officers, consistent with the statute, could take deaf suspects into physical custody before providing an interpreter; the statute requires an interpreter only "within a reasonable time after arrest." Id [Vol. 75 
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DEAF SUSPECTS" RIGHT statements obtained from a deaf suspect when the police detective failed to communicate adequately the Miranda warnings to the deaf suspect.
7
The Oregon interpreting statute 48 provides for interpreters upon arrest, but it does not include a statutory exclusionary rule. Police detectives repeatedly questioned Dale Mason over a two-week period prior to his arrest.
4 9 The police provided four different interpreters, but none of the interpreters "was able to communicate adequately in defendant's own language the concepts contained in Miranda warnings. '50 Concluding that the defendant did not understand his Miranda warnings, 5 ' the court excluded incriminating statements from evidence.
52
As the Mason case shows, sign language interpretation of the Miranda warnings does not ensure that the warnings will be full and effective. Deaf suspects will receive varied and inadequate impressions of the Miranda warnings through sign language interpretation because sign language varies widely in vocabulary and style. 5 3 Moreover, deaf sus- At a later interview, police detectives visited Mason at his home and conducted an interrogation without the use of an interpreter by using written transcription.
Later, a third interpreter spent 10 minutes attempting to interpret the Miranda warnings to Mason before police administered a polygraph test. During the polygraph test, interrogators strapped Mason in a chair and "told [him] not to move or to use his hands and that his answers to questions had to be verbalized." Id at 816, 633 P.2d at 823. This interrogation prevented Mason from using sign language entirely because his hands were not free.
At the final interview, a fourth interpreter spent no time interpreting the Miranda warnings at all. Mason then made the incriminating statements and the police recorded "the interpreter's version of what defendant [was] reported to have said." Id. at 817, 633 P.2d at 824.
51 The trial court reasoned that "[t]o give Miranda warnings to this defendant so as to make an intelligent waiver possible would require an interpreter familiar with and competent in his primary language. This he did not have." Id. at 822 n.3, 633 P.2d at 827 n.3. Mason also could have benefited from an R.S.C. interpreter (Reverse Skills Interpreter). See supra note 12.
52 See Mason, 53 Or. App. at 821, 633 P.2d at 827. The court also determined that police detectives had detained Mason in custody at the police station at the time he made the incriminating statements; such detention is a prerequisite for exclusion of the statements under Oklahoma law. Id. at 821, 633 P.2d at 826.
53 After viewing an experimental film version of the Miranda warnings developed by the National Association of the Deaf in consultation with linguistic experts, three highly educated educators of the prelingually deaf gave widely diverse and substandard interpretations of the warnings:
I. It is about 3 choices you would have when you are arrested by a policeman. 3 pects may not be able to comprehend the legal meaning of the Miranda warnings-the "right to remain silent"-through sign language interpretation. 54 Written or printed forms of the Miranda warnings are ineffective because many deaf persons are functionally illiterate in the English language. 55 choices are: 1. not to sign anything and keep quiet, 2. make a confession to sign your name -if you change my mind about my confession, I must refuse to sign my name and 3. get a lawyer and that I should not worry about money to pay for lawyers fee. I can get them for free. II. He said, "Suppose you had a police interrogating you" -You have 3 choices. 1. keep quiet. 2. get a lawyer -can be free of charge if you have no money. 3. If confession is desired, you can confess some and hold back some information. You have to sign a form called "CONFESSION FORM" (or whatever). III. He said: If you get caught by a police you will have three choices. One is -you don't have to talk, just be silent even if police asking you some questions. Two -you can get a lawyer for some advice. Third -you may tell or admit all the list you have done, then you change mind; you have right to change your mind. Cunningham, The DeafSuspect, BUFFALO POLIcE DEP'T LEGAL BULL., Mar. 16, 1981, at 6-7. 54 Many deaf criminal suspects may have only limited vocabularies in American Sign Language (A.S.L.). Some may not know the particular sign for the concept of "legal right." Although finger-spelling may be used for the word "right" in place of a sign, the deaf person will not understand the meaning of the word unless he or she already understands the concept of "legal right." In the translations of the experimental film version of the Miranda warnings, supra note 53, the deaf educators interpreted the "three rights" contained in the warnings as "three choices." The standard written form of Miranda warnings is above the sixth grade reading comprehension level. Only 10% of the prelingually deaf (those deaf at birth or deaf before the development of language skills) can read above the sixth-grade reading level. Thus, 90% of the prelingually deaf cannot fully comprehend the standard written Miranda warnings. Cunningham, supra note 53, at 3.
More of the deaf can understand another written form of the Miranda warnings, at the second grade reading level, but it omits the legal content of the warning and the substance of the constitutional rights protected. While the sixth grade reading level version conveys "the right to talk to a lawyer," the second grade reading level version merely communicates to deaf suspects that they can talk to an attorney if they desire. Compare the two versions:
Sixth Grade Version Second Grade Version 1. You have the right to remain silent. 2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in Court.
3. You are not being promised anything to talk to us and no threats are or will be made against you. 4. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present now or at any time during questioning. If you proceed to answer questions without a lawyer the questioning will stop if you should change your mind and request the presence of a lawyer. 5. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be furnished without charge before any questioning if you so desire.
Cunningham, supra note 53, at 4.
1. You don't have to talk to me. 2. We will use the things you tell me in Court. We will use them to decide if you did something wrong or not. 3. We will not give you anything for talking. We will not do anything to you if you don't talk. 4. You can talk to a lawyer if you want.
You can have a lawyer here while you talk. If you start to talk and then decide you want a lawyer, we will get one.
5. If you don't have the money for a lawyer, we will get one for you. We can get the lawyer before you start talking.
Recognizing the inadequacies of the interpreted version or the printed form of the Miranda warnings, some interpreters simply instruct deaf suspects to wait for an attorney or question deaf suspects directly to determine whether they want an attorney. 56 While this method may protect deaf suspects from an illegal interrogation, it does not ensure that deaf suspects will be apprised of their right to remain silent, as the United States Supreme Court envisioned in Miranda . 57 Miranda warnings cannot be full and effective for most deaf criminal suspects unless the warnings are interpreted adequately through sign language. In Mason, the Oregon court used an exclusionary rule to guarantee adequate Miranda warnings to deaf suspects through sign language interpretation.
5 8 Although a few states provide interpreters upon arrest, 59 and others mandate an exclusionary rule for non-interpreted interrogations, 60 deaf suspects' right to be informed of the Miranda warnings fully and effectively must be protected in all states.
6
The legal system can guarantee a translation, but deaf educators, interpreters, linguists, and the legal system must work together to provide deaf criminal suspects with a full and effective understanding of the Miranda warnings.
B.
PROTECTING DEAF SUSPECTS' RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
After police arrest deaf criminal suspects and adequately inform them of the Miranda rights, deaf suspects may exercise those constitutional rights by requesting an attorney. The right to an attorney guaranteed by the sixth amendment means the right to effective assistance of counsel. 62 To represent a deaf suspect effectively, the appointed attorney must establish and maintain communication with the client. To do 56 See supra note 50.
57 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. In Chicago in early 1982, city policemen learned a hard lesson about the nature of the deaf. Two policemen observed several teenagers on a street corner signing with each other in sign language, using bold and articulated gestures which the policemen assumed were obscene. As the police started to approach the boys to investigate, the boys ran away. The policemen suspected trouble from the fleeing boys, chased them, accosted them, and struck two of them. The officers arrested the group for disorderly conduct. Later, the police learned from parents that the boys were deaf and that the "obscene" gestures were the boys' means of communicating. The arresting officers had assumed the boys were simply members of a street gang. One parent responded, "The only gang [they're] part of is a deaf-mute crowd ... What makes me so mad is that they didn't even have the sense to bring in an interpreter so the boys could explain themselves." Royko, so, the attorney must use an interpreter for conferences with the deaf client at all stages of the criminal process. Four states presently provide sign language interpretation for conferences between deaf suspects and their attorneys, 63 at least at some stages of the criminal process.
Courts have not considered whether a sign language interpreter is necessary to ensure the effective assistance of counsel for deaf suspects. In cases involving foreign-language-speaking criminal suspects, courts have differed as to whether criminal suspects have the right to interpreted conferences with their attorneys at various stages of the criminal process. The courts all recognized, however, that judges must consider the existence of communication between the suspect and the attorney in evaluating whether the suspect's right to the assistance of counsel was protected.
In Parra v. Page, 64 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals set aside the defendant's conviction in the lower court where the Spanishspeaking defendant appeared at arraignment and pleaded guilty without the benefit of a Spanish interpreter. 6 5 Although the court appointed an attorney on the day of the arraignment, the attorney was not able to communicate with Parra to formulate a defense or even to discover the facts. In setting aside the conviction, the court concluded that Parra did not understand the proceeding and had no effective assistance of counsel.
66
In United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson ,67 involving a Spanish-speaking defendant, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered an evidentiary hearing to consider "whether or not the possible breakdown in communication between petitioner and his counsel. . . affected petitioner's constitutional rights to effective counsel, due process, and/or confrontation." ' 6 8 The district court expressed concern about "whether petitioner could comment to his lawyer about the witnesses' testimony, point out inconsistencies with the facts if they oc-63 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (West Supp. 1983) (possibly restricting interpreted sessions to conferences in court or immediately prior to trial because the language of the statute provides for an interpreter "to interpret preparations with the deaf person's attorney"); Ky. REv. STAT. § 30A.425 (1980) (broadly defining the duties of the interpreter to include interpreting "any and all meetings and conferences between client and his attorney" during court and court-related proceedings); OKLA. antee of effective assistance of counsel means that the deaf suspect should be provided with an interpreter for conferences with the attorney during trial, then two interpreters may be required: one to interpret the testimony and one to interpret conferences with the attorney. Alternatively, the trial judge could order breaks in the course of the trial for such conferences.
The Navarro court's analysis of the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial also should apply to pre-trial conferences between the suspect and the attorney because the wellprepared attorney always should be aware of the client's version of the facts. Furthermore, an attorney may help protect the suspect's rights at interrogation. however, when they show a failure to understand communications with counsel.
79
When the criminal justice system makes interpreters available for conferences between deaf suspects and attorneys, courts will have to face the question of the confidentiality of the interpreted conference. Although all criminal suspects are entitled to the benefits of the attorneyclient privilege, 8 0 it is unclear whether deaf criminal suspects enjoy the attorney-client privilege for conversations when an interpreter is present. Deaf suspects will not give their attorneys a full and honest disclosure without an attorney-client privilege that also guarantees the confidentiality of the interpreter. Fourteen states protect by statute the confidentiality of interpreted conversations that would be privileged if the interpreter were not present. 8 1 Although the courts have never ruled 79 Deaf criminal suspects may face a difficult burden in showing their failure to understand. Some courts have held that deaf suspects may "understand" the proceedings through written transcription.
In Turner v. State, 429 So. 2d 645 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) , an Alabama court affirmed the conviction of a deaf-mute defendant who appeared at an arraignment without an interpreter. The deaf defendant communicated with the judge entirely by written transcription and nodding his head. Citing Todd v. State, 380 So. 2d 370 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), for the proposition that a deaf-mute may testify at trial through written questions and answers, the Turner court extended the holding in Todd to allow a deaf defendant to be apprised of the proceedings at arraignment through written transcription. Turner, 429 So.2d at 647. The court reasoned: "All the law contemplates is that the accused know and understand the nature of the accusation he is called upon to answer." Id. The court noted that where the suspect fails to request an interpreter under the state interpreting statute (ALA. CODE § 12-21-131 to 12-21-134 (1975) (enacted 1965)), how the constitutional requirement that the suspect understand the accusation is satisfied is immaterial, "so long as it is actually satisfied." Id.
It is common for a deaf person, or anyone conversing in an unfamiliar language, to nod his or her head in agreement without fully understanding the nature of the assent. Thus, interpreters and lawyers should ascertain a "yes" or "no" answer rather than a nodding of the head.
Although written transcription is inadequate for the purposes of a lengthy criminal trial, see supra note 11, it may serve to inform a particular deaf suspect of the proceedings. The Turner court correctly stressed that the suspect actually must understand the proceedings. Turner errs, however, in placing the burden on the suspect to request an interpreter or, by failing to request one, to waive the right. See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § § 3(b), 5 for a solution to the waiver problem.
80 Under the attorney-client privilege, all communications made to an attorney by the client seeking legal advice are permanently protected from disclosure by the client and the attorney unless the privilege is waived. 8 J. WIGMORE The Kentucky interpreting statute's section on privilege is one of the most well-written: Every person who acts as an interpreter in circumstances involving the arrest, police on this issue, 8 2 the confidentiality of interpreted conversations should be protected, and states without such protections should enact statutes providing for interpreter confidentiality.
3
The assistance of counsel cannot be effective for deaf suspects unless suspects have an opportunity to confer with their attorneys through a sign language interpreter. A few states provide for interpreted conferences between deaf suspects and attorneys, 8 4 but the right to effective assistance of counsel must be protected by statute in all states.
8 5 Furthermore, attorneys must be informed of the special problems confronting deaf suspects in the criminal justice system. 1153 (1978) , the prosecutor summoned an interpreter before the grand jury to testify about a conversation between a deaf suspect and his attorney when the interpreter and two other persons were also present. Because the grand jury indicted the suspect without the interpreter's testimony, the court ruled the issue of interpreter confidentiality moot. To protect suspects' constitutional right of confrontation, courts have provided the right to interpreters in cases involving foreign-language-speaking suspects where interpreters would aid the suspect's understanding. In Garcia v. State,92 a Texas court ruled that the lower court abused its discretion by denying the Spanish-speaking defendant an interpreter because "[u]nless appellant was in some manner, either through his counsel or an interpreter, afforded knowledge of the testimony of the witness, the right of cross-examination could not be exercised by him."1 9 3 Likewise, in United States ex reL Negron v. New York, 94 the Second Circuit noted that it is "imperative that every criminal defendant-if the right to be present is to have meaning-possesses 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.' ,,95 Like these foreign-language-speaking defendants, deaf defendants can be guaranteed their constitutional right to confront the witnesses only when they understand the testimony. The 89 448 U. S. 56 (1980 [t] he constitutional right of confrontation means something more than merely bringing the accused and the witness face to face; it embodies and carries with it the valuable right of cross-examination of the witness," Id. 94 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970) . In Negron, the court affirmed the relief granted in a habeas corpus proceeding, ruling that Negron's trial lacked the basic fairness required by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the trial judge provided an interpreter to translate the testimony of two Spanish-speaking witnesses for the benefit of the court and the jury, Negron had no interpreter to translate the testimony of the English-speaking witnesses.
95 Id at 390 (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1962) (per curiam)). Judge Kaufman, writing for the Second Circuit in Negron, also commented:
ITihe right that was denied Negron seems to us even more consequential than the right of confrontation. Considerations of fairness, the integrity of the fact-finding process, and the potency of our adversary system of justice forbid that the state should prosecute a defendant who is not present at his own trial, unless by his conduct he waives that right. ... Not only for the sake of effective cross-examination, however, but as a matter of simple humaneness, Negron deserved more than to sit in total incomprehension as the trial proceeded. Particularly inappropriate in this nation where many languages are spoken is a callousness to the crippling language handicap of a newcomer to its shores, whose life and freedom the state by its criminal processes chooses to put in jeopardy. Id at 389-90 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 75 criminal justice system must protect deaf defendants' right to understand the testimony by providing a sign language interpreter.
Presently, thirty-nine states provide by statute for the mandatory appointment of an interpreter at the criminal trial of a deaf defendant.
6
Under most of the mandatory interpreting statutes, the court must appoint an interpreter unless the deaf defendant can adequately understand the proceedings without a sign language interpreter. The only constitutionally acceptable standard of review is whether the deaf suspect was able to understand the proceedings without a sign language interpreter; this is precisely the standard envisioned in the mandatory interpreting statutes.108 The "abuse of discretion" standard or "fairness" test employed by some courts is not appropriate because the courts remain free to overlook a suspect's lack of understanding and consequent denial of constitutional rights. While the absence of prejudice to a civil party provides support for upholding trial court decisions, 1 0 9 criminal suspects deserve to have such denials reviewed under a stricter standard. As the framers of the Constitution recognized in the sixth amendment, 1 10 prejudice is likely to result when a deaf defendant cannot confront adverse witnesses and cannot report possible inaccuracies in testimony. Trial courts should not deny deaf defendants the right to understand the testimony through sign language interpretation merely because the deaf defendant failed to request an interpreter. 11 The burden of coming forward with evidence of an inability to understand spoken language should be on the deaf defendant only where such inability is not obvious to the trial court.
D. PROTECTING DEAF SUSPECTS INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL
Courts determining whether to provide an interpreter focus on the nature of the deaf suspect's understanding of the criminal process. In sign language interpreter at plaintiff's hearing "did not prejudice [his] case and does not, therefore, warrant a reversal." Id. at 700, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
105 People v. Guillory, 178 Cal. App. 2d 854, 3 Cal. Rptr. 415, aJ'd sub nom. Guillory v. Wilson, 402 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1968) . In Guilloy, involving a deaf suspect's malfunctioning hearing aid, the court put the burden on the deaf defendant to bring batteries or request the court to change seating arrangements at trial to enable the defendant to better understand the testimony. Reluctant to require the trial judge to make any special effort, the court held: "No objection was made to proceeding further or effort made to change the seating arrangements. . . . It is quite apparent that any difficulty defendant may have had in following the proceedings was self-induced." Id at 859, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
106 Field v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 137, 232 S.W.2d 717 (1950) . On rehearing, the court in Field made clear that the deaf-mute defendant could waive the constitutional right to confront the witnesses by the failure to request the services of an interpreter within a reasonable time. Id at 140, 232 S.W.2d at 718.
107 In Field, the court heard direct testimony by a witness, the victim, that the defendant shot at her. Id. at 138, 232 S.W.2d at 718; see also infra note 167. 108 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 3(b); see also supra note 23. 109 See supra note 104. 110 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, supra note 1.
I II See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 3(a)-(b).
[Vol. 75 most cases, a sign language interpreter can aid deaf suspects to reach a full understanding of the proceedings. In some cases, however, deaf suspects are completely unable to communicate even with the aid of a sign language interpreter. Because the Constitution guarantees to the defendant in criminal prosecutions the rights to "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" and to the "assistance of counsel," '1 2 deaf suspects unable to communicate may not stand trial.
113
Although incompetent suspects are incapable of standing trial, they also may not be committed to mental institutions "simply on account of [their] incompetency to stand trial on the charges ....
-114 In Jackson v. Indiana,'1 5 the United States Supreme Court held that defendants found unfit to stand trial must be either civilly committed or released.' t 6 A combination of temporary civil commitment 1 7 and sign language training equitably protects suspects' constitutional right not to stand trial while giving suspects sign language training so that they may someday stand trial. Furthermore, temporary commitment protects the public interest in helping to keep streets free of suspected lawbreakers.
In effect, the Illinois courts achieved this result in the case of Donald Lang. Lang, who had no communication skills and no knowledge of 112 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, supra note 1. 113 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (test of competency to stand trial is "whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him").
In United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976), involving a mentally ill defendant, Judge Bazelon ruled: "It is 'fundamental to an adversary system ofjustice' that an individual whose 'mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense' may not be subjected to a trial." Id. at 725 (citations omitted).
William Blackstone recognized in the eighteenth century that "if it is found at the trial of the prisoner that he cannot understand the proceedings, the judge ought to discharge the jury and put an end to the trial, or order a verdict of not guilty." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24 (9th ed. 1873); see Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REv. 454, 458 (1967) .
Many courts never considered the issue of a deaf defendant's capacity to stand trial because some states traditionally did not hold the deaf criminally responsible for their behavior. This practice changed along with enlightened social attitudes toward the deaf. P. HIG-GINS, supra note 5, at 25-26.
114 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 720 (1972). 115 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 116 Id. at 738. InJackson, the Court ruled that the state may not subject a mentally retarded deaf defendant to permanent civil commitment on the basis of an unproved criminal charge that is forever unprovable because the deaf criminal suspect is constitutionally prevented from standing trial. Id.
117 In most states, civil commitment must be based on a judicial finding that a person (1) is mentally ill and reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another, or (2) is mentally ill and unable to provide for his basic physical needs. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 1-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
[ Lang's lawyer filed a petition in habeas corpus, contending that Lang was serving a sentence for life when he had never been convicted of a crime. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Lang deserved a trial to determine whether the state had enough evidence to convict Lang or whether he should be released. 12 1 At this trial, five years after the 1965 murder, the state dropped the charges and released Lang because the principal witness had died.1 2 2
After the second charge of murder, Lang's lawyer again waived Lang's constitutional right not to stand trial, 2 3 and the trial court, taking special precautions to guarantee a fair trial, sentenced Lang to fourteen to twenty-five years imprisonment after the jury found Lang guilty.' 24 The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the conviction, 25 finding that "no trial procedures could effectively compensate for the handicap of a deaf mute with whom there could be no communication. "' 126 That court remanded the case for a hearing on Lang's fitness to stand trial.' 27 In 1979, after procedural delays, both Lang's public defender and conservator appealed his case to the Illinois Supreme Court.1
28
The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that deaf criminal sus-118 People v. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d 311, 316-22, 391 N.E.2d 350, 351-54 (1979) . After eighteen years of litigation in the Illinois courts, Donald Lang's case still is unresolved.
119 Id at 317, 391 N.E.2d at 351. Jackson, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) , which established the due process and equal protection rights of deaf criminal suspects, had not yet been decided.
120 People v. Lang, 37 Ill. 2d 75, 81, 224 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1967) ; see supra note 116. The Superintendent of the State Department of Mental Health certified that it was unlikely that Lang would ever be able to stand trial because he performed poorly in sign language training. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d at 317, 391 N.E.2d at 351. 121 People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d 281, 288, 263 N.E.2d 109, 113 (1970 Hurd 1980) )). The court directed the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities to develop an appropriate language training program. In October 1977, however, the trial court allowed the Department to discharge Lang to the Cook County jail, at the same time issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Department to create a treatment program. The appellate court reversed the mandamus order and denied a separate petition for haheas corpus filed on Lang's behalf. Lang, 62 Ill. App. 3d 688, 378 N.E.2d 1106 App. 3d 688, 378 N.E.2d (1978 .
128 Lang, 76 Ill. 2d at 311, 391 N.E.2d at 350. pects ruled unfit to stand trial present special problems for the criminal justice system. 129 A finding of unfitness could result in permanent commitment to a mental institution, which creates "long periods of confinement for criminal defendants who, had they been fit, might have plea bargained to a relatively light sentence, obtained an outright or insanity acquittal, or received a prison sentence subject to both maximum limits and parole."' 30 The result is inequitable to deaf criminal suspects. Other defendants who are unfit to stand trial because they are mentally incompetent are legitimately subject to involuntary civil commitment. Deaf suspects like Lang, however, become subject to commitment because of an alleged crime for which they cannot stand trial and for which the criminal justice system presents no other solution.
Donald Remanding the case for a hearing on Lang's dangerousness, 3 4 the court indicated its intention to keep Lang in custody where he could attempt to learn sign language. Although it is unlikely Lang will ever be fit to stand trial, 135 he is being given care and training in sign language.
The crux of the Illinois decision, however, is that deaf defendants with little cultural contact (those who lacked the opportunities to develop communication skills) may be subject to civil commitment based entirely on circumstantial evidence of dangerousness. 136 In effect, the Illinois court defines deafness, where the deaf person has no communication skills, as a mental illness. The Louisiana Supreme Court followed the Lang precedent in State v. Williams,' 37 ruling over strong dissent 138 that deaf suspects found unfit to stand trial may be subject to involuntary civil commitment when the trial court finds them to be dangerous.' 39 The court highlighted procedural safeguards that protect civilly committed persons from wrongful commitment: judicial review after 180 days, administrative review by the director of mental health, and federal habeas corpus.' 40 These procedural reviews are not adequate because they do not resolve the question of the deaf defendant's guilt or innocence; thus, under this reasoning, deaf suspects may continue to be subject to permanent commitment on the basis of circumstantial evidence of guilt.
Legislatures should enact statutes mandating temporary custodial care and training in sign language for deaf defendants incapable of standing trial.' 4 ' Alternatively, the courts could release deaf defendants in custodial care or on probation while providing sign language training through a state agency. Deaf suspects incapable of standing trial must be afforded an opportunity as early as possible to obtain a trial on the unproven criminal charge.
II. IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT OF DEAF SUSPECTS TO UNDERSTAND THE PROCEEDINGS
Deaf criminal suspects' right to an interpreter at all stages of the criminal process is meaningless without effective machinery in state and federal criminal justice systems to implement the right. Many states 42 and the federal government 4 3 have enacted legislation to implement and protect deaf suspects' right to an interpreter. Although most legisla-137 392 So. 2d 641 (La. 1980) . 138 "The majority now strains a new definition of'mentally ill' from the defendant's inability to communicate because of his speech and hearing impairment." Id at 645 (Dixon, J., dissenting). Judge Dixon suggested "interdiction," or custodial care, for the deaf defendant who is ruled unfit to stand trial. Id. at 645-46.
139 "If a person is found unfit to stand trial because of an inability to effectively communicate, he should be considered 'mentally ill' under La.R.S. 28:54 unless his unfitness is due solely to a physical condition. Although the Nevada statute does not specifically allow the deaf defendant to request an R.S.C. interpreter, it authorizes the deaf participant to request a replacement for the appointed interpreter and gives the deaf person a choice of interpreters "whenever possible." NEv. REV. STAT. § 50.052 (1979) .
In Arizona, if the only available interpreter "does not possess adequate interpreting skills for the particular situation, the court . . .may permit the deaf person to nominate another person [such as an R.S.C. interpreter or a family member] to act as an intermediary interpreter between the deaf person and the appointed interpreter during proceedings." ARIZ. REv. STAT (Supp. 1983) . The deaf person who can speak and relies on speechreading rather than sign language can use an aural-oral interpreter who exaggerates the lip and facial movements of speech so that the deaf person can easily and effectively decipher the words spoken and then respond verbally. The use of aural-oral interpreting is rare because it requires a very well-trained deaf speechreader. (West Supp. 1983 ) (the right to an interpreter can be waived only by a non-signing deaf person in writing and with the approval of the person's attorney and the judge); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(a)(3) (Supp. 1983) (right to an interpreter may not be waived except in writing, subject to the approval of the deaf person's attorney and the judge); VA. CODE § 19.2-164.1 (1983) (deaf person may waive the right with the approval of counsel). Requiring the approval of counsel for waiving an interpreter is not much protection for the deaf suspect because most attorneys have no experience with interpreters or deaf suspects. This is one argument for public awareness programs about the deaf. Law schools in particular are well-situated to sponsor such programs. be able to request an interpreter orally. Without paper and pencil, deaf suspects cannot request an interpreter even in writing. The interpreting statutes should provide for interpreters on the request of the deaf suspect or next friend of the suspect; furthermore, appointing authorities should be required to procure an interpreter when they observe that the suspect cannot understand spoken words.150
The state interpreting statutes should not place the burden of requesting an interpreter on the deaf suspect alone; likewise, they should not place too much discretion in the appointing authority.' 5 1 The appointing authority may exercise discretion and not appoint an interpreter under the erroneous belief that the suspect is understanding the proceeding. Because the suspect cannot always communicate the request, mandatory appointment is necessary. The statutes should avoid the possibility that the court will fail to appoint an interpreter simply because the judge believes the testimony or proceeding is not crucial to the question of the suspect's guilt or innocence.1 52 Even guilty suspects are guaranteed the procedural safeguards of the Constitution, inter alia, a trial by jury and the assistance of counsel. The state interpreting laws generally provide that courts and other officials should request interpreters from a state agency or association of the deaf. 153 Sixteen states require that interpreters meet some kind of statutory qualifications ranging from standards established by the National Registry of Interpreters 15 4 to the simple requirement that the in-150 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § § 3, 5. 151 Some statutes place too much discretion in the appointing authority in determining the need for an interpreter. South Carolina's interpreting statute, for example, provides for judicial appointment of interpreters "unless the deaf person shall waive such or the judge shall find that it is not necessary for the fulfillment ofjustice." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-110 (Law. Co-op. 1976) . Under this standard, ajudge who believes that an interpreter is not essential to achieve justice could disregard the entire statute even where the deaf suspect cannot understand the proceedings. See also ALA. CODE § 12-21-131 (1975) ; HAWAII REV. STAT. § terpreter be "able to communicate with the deaf suspect."
1 55 The interpreting statutes should explicitly define the qualifications required for legal interpreters' 5 6 and provide for a state agency to coordinate interpreter requests.1 5 7
Once the judge or appointing authority has located an interpreter, some states also require the appointing authority to determine that the interpreter is "readily able to communicate" with the deaf suspect.I 5 It is essential for the appointing authority to ensure that the deaf suspect actually understands the interpreter. Twenty-seven states require the interpreter to take an oath to make a true interpretation to the interpreter's best skill and judgment 5 9 and one state permits the judge to require such an oath. 60 These procedural safeguards help guarantee an effective interpretation.' 6 1
Although the substantive and procedural guidelines for sign language interpretation in the criminal process vary, one similarity exists: all but a few of the states that provide interpreters in criminal proceedings also provide for state or court compensation of the interpreter. 162 Some states may be reluctant to compensate interpreters, believing that such compensation constitutes the use of public funds to aid private individuals.' 63 Compensation of interpreters to guarantee the deaf suspects' right to understand the proceedings, however, should not differ from compensation of court-appointed attorneys to guarantee indigent suspects' right to the assistance of counsel. Interpreters also perform a public service in conserving the time of judges and juries and increasing trial efficiency, and therefore should be compensated by the state as are court reporters, bailiffs, and other necessary personnel. 1 64 The interpreting statutes should provide compensation for interpreting at all stages of the criminal process and should establish a state agency to coordinate interpreter compensation.
65
The state interpreting statutes lack enforcement provisions or incentives for the appointment of interpreters. With the exception of eight states that exclude at trial a statement taken from a deaf suspect without an interpreter present, 66 no penalties exist for criminal justice officials who do not provide the deaf suspect with an interpreter as required by law. Officials, including judges, can and do ignore the interpreting statutes. 1 67 The interpreting laws should contain an exclusionary clause' 68 and should mandate a retrial when deaf suspects are denied interpreters to which they are entitled under the statute. 169 The exclusionary and retrial provisions, codifying appellate review, thus would serve to make judges and police officials aware of the need to provide interpreters to guarantee deaf criminal suspects' right to understand the proceedings at all stages of the criminal process.
III. CONCLUSION
Deaf criminal suspects have the constitutional right to understand the proceedings at all stages of the criminal process. Sign language interpretation is essential to protect deaf suspects' rights to understand Miranda warnings, police questioning, interrogation, notification of charges, and criminal proceedings at court. States should adopt comprehensive interpreting statutes to assure that these rights are protected.
Protecting these constitutional rights by statute may not be enough for deaf suspects, however. Judges, police officers, court personnel, and attorneys also must be made aware of the special needs and concerns of deaf suspects through awareness programs, information services, training programs, and review courses. The deaf suspects' constitutional right to understand fully and participate in the proceedings at all stages of the criminal process can be protected only when legislatures, judges, and police officials work together to eliminate the legal handicaps of the deaf.
IV.

APPENDIX: MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE 170
1. To protect fully the constitutional rights of deaf persons and those who are unable to understand or communicate spoken language, and to ensure a full understanding of criminal proceedings and a full participation in the criminal process, this Act is hereby established. 2. Definitions. For the purposes of this Act, (a) "Deaf" means those who cannot understand spoken words through normal auditory processes. (b) "Deaf person" means any witness, suspect, accused, detainee, defendant, juror, complainant, victim, or interested party to the action who cannot understand spoken words through normal auditory processes. (c) "Qualified interpreter" means a person with the knowledge and uninterpreter, they'll go without you." Chicago Hearing Society Workshop, Chicago (Sept. 11, 1982) .
168 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 10.
Id
170
This Model Interpreting Statute borrows from several of the state interpreting statutes discussed in this Comment.
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